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STATEMENT
This is an appeal from the judgment of the lower court
rendered on the 2nd day of February, 1949, in favor of
the defendant W. Ed Bingham and against the plaintiff
''no cause of action.''
The facts as shown by the pleadings are :
That the appellant, Wilbert J. Dawson, was and is
the father of Lawrence P. Dawson, 'vho was of the approxiinate age of nine (9) years at the time of his death
on ?\fay 8, 1948, 'vhen he was struck and killed by a car
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driven by the defendant Guy Elias Carr at the intersection of Highway U-38 and 4800 South Street in Weber
County, Utah, after having just alighted from a school
bus owned by Weber County School District and driven
by the respondent W. Ed Bingham, who was then and
there an employee of the defendant School District.
The school bus had been proceeding northward on
Highway U-38 and had been stopped on the southeast
corner of the intersection of that highway with 4800
South Street. It was stopped in such a position that the
school children thereon, when leaving the bus, were compelled, by reason of a ditch bank, grass and weeds, to
walk around the front end of the bus into 4800 South
Street in order to proceed westward along that street.
The boy Lawrence P. Dawson walked around the front
end of the bus, into 4800 South Street and proceeded
westward across Highway U-38 toward his home, which
was west of the highway on 4800 South Street, when he
was struck by an automobile driven northward on Highway U-38 by the defendant Guy Elias Carr and killed.
The place and n1anner of the stopping of the bus by
the respondent W. Ed Bingham was· contrary to the
Regulations Governing Pupil Transportation and School
Bus Standards of the Utah Stat8 Road Commission
adopted June, 1947, in conformity with Section 57-7-176
of Utah Code Annotated, 1943, by and with the advice
of the State Board of Education, the pertinent excerpts
of which Regulations are hereinafter set out (p. 8, 9 of
this brief).
The respondent denied that the place or 1nanner of
his stopping the bus was wrongful.
The complaint of the plaintiff was dismissed as to the
-··44{ 2
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defendant Board of Education upon demurrer.
The trial of the cause as against the defendants Guy
Elias Carr and W. Ed Bingham resulted in a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant Guy
Elias Carr in the an1ount of $5,000.00 and a seperate
verdict in favor of the defendant W. Ed Bingham and
against the plaintiff "no cause of action."
The judgment against the defendant Guy Elias Carr
has been satisfied, with a full reservation of appellant's
rights against W. Ed Bingham, the respondent herein.
STATEMENT OF ERRORS
A statement of errors upon which appellant relies for
reversal of the judgment and decree of the District Court
of the Second Judicial District of the State of Utah within and for Weber County, is as follows:

1. That the court erred in denying appellant's requested instruction Number 13, as follows:
"You are instructed that it was the duty of the
defendant, W. Ed Bingham, to require the children
to pass behind rather than in front of his bus. If you
find fro1n the evidence that he did not do so, then
you will find that his failure so to do was negligence
as a matter of la-\v, and you will find in favor of the
plaintiff and against said defendant.''
2. That the court erred in denying appellant's requested instruction Number 14, as follows:
"You are instructed that if you find from the evidence that the defendant, vV. Ed Bingham, did not
require the deceased child, Lavvrence P. Dawson, to
pass behind rather than in front of the bus, that said
defendant was guilty of misconduct as a matter of
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law. Upon such a finding by you, you are further instructed that that misconduct on the part of said defendant overcomes any question of contributory neggligence on the part of the deceased child, Lawrence
P. Dawson, and you will then give no consideration
whatever to any question of contributory negligence
on the part of said child.''
3. That the court erred in denying appellant's requested instruction Number 19, as follows:
"You are instructed that children must be expected to act upon childish instincts and impulses;
and others who are chargeable with a duty of care
and caution towards them must calculate upon this
and take precautions accordingly.''
. 4. That the court erred in denying appellant's requested instruction Number 27, as follows:
''You are instructed that a driver of a school bus
is charged with the knowledge that children upon
leaving said bus may be expected to act upon childish instincts and impulses and cross a street or highway in front of said bus without looking and without being mindful of their danger.''
5. That the court erred in denying appellant's requested instruction Number 28, as follows:
''You are instructed that a person driving a school
bus rriust expect children to be thoughtless of prior
instructions, and must expect them to do the things
children are ~pt to do, and must take such precautions and must do those things which the law and
regulations require him to do for their safety.
''You are further instructed that the regulations
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of the State Road Co1nn1ission and the State Board
of Eduration, adopted pursuant to law, provide that
the driver of the bus shall require all pupils to pass
behind the bus rather than in front of the bus, and
require that a srhool bus shall not pick up or let off
pupils except at regularly designated stops, and that
the bus shall not be stopped in line of traffic to load
or unload pupils.''
6. That the court erred in denying appellant's requested instruction N lunber 31, as follows:
''If you find from the evidence that the defendant
\V-. Ed Bingham could have required the deceased
child Lawrence P. Dawson to pass behind rather
than in front of the bus by definite, clear, or positive
instructions, or by stopping his bus in such a position, or at such a place, as would require it, and that
said defendant did not do so, then you will find that
he was negligent, and you find in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.''_
7. That the court erred in denying appellant's rectnested instruction Number 32, as follows:
"If you find fron1 the evidence that the defendant
W. Ed Binghan1 could have stopped his bus in such
a position, or at such a place, that the deceased child
Lawrence P. Dawson would have been required to
pass behind rather than in front of said bus, and that
said defendant did not do so, then you will find that
he vvas negligent, and you will find in favor of the
plaintiff and against said defendant.''
8. That the court erred in denying appellant's requested instruction Nun1ber 33, as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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''You are instructed that it was the duty of the defendant W. Ed Bingham to stop and discharge the
deceased child Lawrence P. Dawson, and the other
school children, at a regularly designated bus stop.
If you find from all of the evidence that he did not do
so, then you will find that his failure so to do was
negligence ·as a matter of law. And you will find in
favor of the plaintiff and against said defendant.''
9. The court erred in giving its instruction Number
12, as follows :
' 'You are instructed that there is no evidence in
this case that defendant W. Ed Bingham stopped
said school bus in a place which was not a regularly
designated bus stop and this claim of negligence is
withdrawn from your consideration.''
10. That the court erred in giving its instruction
Number 13, as follows :
· ''You are instructed that there is no evidence in
this case that immediately prior to said accident, the
defendant W. Ed Bingham stopped said school bus
in line of traffic to unload pupils and this claim of
.negligence is withdrawn from your consideration.''
11. That the court erred in giving its instruction
Number 14, as follows:
"You are instructed that it was the duty of the defendant, Ed Bingham, to stop his bus in such a position and at such a place to require the children to
pass behind rather than in front of his bus. If you
find from the evidence that said defendant did not
do so, then you will find that he was negligent, and
-··~ 6 ~··Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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if you further find that said negligence 'vas a proximate cause of the injuries and death complained of,
you \vill find in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant, W. Ed Bingha1n, and award plaintiff
dan1ages; provided ho,vever, you further find that
the deceased boy "Tas not guilty of contributory
negligence.''
12. That the court erred in giving its instruction
Number 15, as follows:
~'You

are further instructed that defendant W. Ed
Bingham "Tas not negligent because he did not take
the alternate route and stop his bus on the so-called
bridge stop. It was his legal right to take the route
along high,vay U -38 traveling northward.''
ARGUMENT
It is our three-fold contention that: (1) The lower
court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the respondent \V. Ed Bingham was guilty of negligence as a
1natter of law, and in failing to submit to the jury, with
respect to the respondent W. Ed Bingham, the single
question as to the amount of damages. (2) That the court
erred in submitting to the jury the question of contributory negligence on the part of the deceased child Lawrence P. Dawson, for the reason that the statute (Section 57-7-177, Utah Code Annotated, 1943) defined and
characterized the respondent W. Ed Binghan1's actions
as ''misconduct''; that misconduct goes beyond negligence and arnounts to negligence per se in effect, and
preeludes any defense of contributory negligence. ( 3)
The lower court, having refused to instruct the jury that
the respondent \V. Ed Bingharn \Vas guilty of negligence
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

as a matter of law, erred in denying appellant'~· motion
for a new trial, for the reason that the verdict was
against the weight of the evidence.
First:
The pertinent sections of the Utah Code read as follows:
Section 57.;,7-176. Commission to Regulate Design and
Operation of School Buses.
''The state road commission by and with the advice of the state board of education shall adopt and
enforce regulations not inconsistent with this act to
govern the design and operation of all school buses
for the transportation of school children when owned
and operated by any school district . . . . Ev~ry school district, its officers and employees, ....
shall be subject to said regulations.''
Section 57-7-177. Id. Violation of Regulations-Penalty.
''Any officer or employee of any school district
who violates any of the regulations provided for in
the next preceding section . . . . shall be guilty of
misconduct and subject to removal from office or
employment..... ''
Pursuant to the authority and direction of these sections of the Code the Utah State Road Commission, by
and with the advice of the State Board of Education
promulgated the following regulations:
1.

Chapter 2, Paragraph 2-2 (a)
''The school bus shall not pick up or let off pupils except at regularly designated stops.''
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2.

Paragraph 2-2(b)
''The bus shall not be stopped in line of traffic
to load or unload pupils. (Note: Widened shoulders where desirable for stops will be provided
upon application.) ''

3.

Chapter 2, Paragraph 2-2 (c)
"The driver shall require all pupils to pass behind rather than in front of the bus.''

The respondent W. Ed Bingham flew directly in the
face of these requirements and drove where he pleased
and stopped where he pleased, with the result that the
very tragedy which the law and the regulations were designed to prevent did occur.
The section first quoted above (57-7-176) provides,
among other things, that "Every school district, its officers and employees, .... shall be subject to said regulations." Section 57-7-177 provides that "Any officer or
employee of any school district who violates any of the
regulations provided for in the next preceding section ...
shall be guilty of misconduct and subject to removal from
office or employment.'' (Italics ours).
Obviously, the Legislature had determined that the
lives of school children of this state were invaluable and
had sought to throw every possible safeguard around ·
them, and had fixed the punishment of those who violated
the regulations which the Legislature intended to have
established as a procedure of safe conduct.
The law and the regulations provided that the respondent W. Ed Binghan1 should require the school children
\vhen alighting- fron1 the school bus to pass to the rear of
---~
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and behind the bus. The reason for the requirement is
evident. By requiring them to pass behind the bus, the
children would be in the· best possible position to protect
themselves from oncoming traffic. In that position they
would have a clear vision of traffic coming from the rear,
unobstructed by the school bus; and they themselves
\Vould be visible to oncoming traffic.
"Whether the Legislature enacts a safety statute,
it declares that injury from violation of it is reason. ably to be anticipated. The Legislature establishes
the standard of care to be exercised and liability for
injury resulting from violation of the standard follows. Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. _223, 240, 241,
234 N. W. 372."
B~tts v. Ward, et al., 227 Wis.
387, 279 N. W. 6, 116 A. L. R. 1441
"The view that the violations of a statute may
constitute actionable negligence is predicated upon
the principle that when an ~ct is forbidden by express provision of law, the standard of the legislature becomes absolute, and one who perpetrates the
prohibited act will be deemed to be liable regardless
of whether the resulting injury might have been
foreseen by a prudent person.''
38 Am. Jr. 831, 832, Sec. 160
and cases cited.
In Peterson v. Standard Oil Co., 55 Or. 511, 106 Pac.
337, Am. Cas. 1912-A. 625, the court stated in part (106
Pac. 341):
''It is to be regretted that two or three authoritative courts have fallen into the aberration of holding that the violation of a statute, or municipal or-··~
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dinance, enacted for the public safety, does not establish negligence per se; but is 1nerely 'vhat the books
term •evidence of negligence '-that is to say, conlpetent but not conclusive evidence, to be subn1itted to
the jury on the question of negligence or no negligence. It seems to have escaped the attention of the
judges who have laid do'vn this rule that it has the
effect of clothing com1non juries with the dispensing
power-the power to set aside acts of the Legislature-a power exercised by the early Kings of England, though its exercise was odious to our ancestors,
~o much so that the exercise of it disappeared with
the Tudors.
''Whatever Inay be the rule where the measure of
care is prescribed by the by-la,vs of a municipal corporation, logic and reason would seem to indicate
that, where the laws of the state for the protection of
the public have prescribed that certain precaution
shall be observed in the labelling of kerosene and
distillates, such requirements constitute a legislative
declaration of the minimum of care necessary under
the circun1stances, and that a less degree of care is
negligence as a matter of law, and that the pleading
and proof necessary in case of injury arising under
such circumstances need only show the greach of
the statutory requirements, the fact that such breach
was the proximate cause of the injury, and the damages sustained thereby.''
In a case discussing a statute requiring an audible
warning when approaching pedestrians, the Michigan
Court said, in the case of Johnston v. Cornelius, 166 N.
W. 983, 985, in part:
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"It lays a statutory duty upon drivers of automobiles, which may be greater than the duty of exercising ordinary prudence; but the driver of automobiles must, nevertheless, discharge such duty or respond for its neglect. Levyn v. Koppin, 183 Mich.
232, 149. N. W. 993."
Second:
The Legislature laid down the rules. It wanted them
obeyed for the protection of school children. It fixed penalties for violation. It said that a person breaking the
rules would be ''guilty of misconduct.''
We must presume that the Legislature used the word
''misconduct'' advisedly when enacting the law quoted
above (57-7-177). It becomes important, therefore, to examine the meaning of the word ''misconduct,'' with
which violations of these important code sections were
characterized, in order to understand the importance
which the Legislature attached to those sections, and in
order to understand its determination to safeguard the
lives of school children.
The term ''misconduct'' is a much stronger word than
''negligence.'' It goes far beyond negligence in scope and
meaning and responsibility. In the case of Mandella vs.
~v.Iariano, 200 A tl. 478 (Rhode Island, 1938) the Court
said in part :
''This is an action for negligence, and negligence,
speaking generally, is a relative term in1plying failure to comply with an indefinite rule of conduct in
. the circumstances of any particular case. Intent is
not an essential elen1ent of negligenee. The tern1
-··~
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'n1isconduct ', on the other hand, in1plies a wrong
intention and not a mere error of judgment; it implies fault beyond the error of judgment ....
"In all the dictionaries that we have consulted,
whether law dictionaries or those in general use,
such as Ballantine, Black, Webster's New International, and \Vinston's Simplified dictionary, the
term 'misconduct' is defined as a transgression of
some established and definite rule of action; a forbidden act; a dereliction from duty; unlawful behavior; wilful in character; improper or wrong
behavior. Where synonyms are given, the synonymous terms are misdemeanor, misdeed, misbehavior,
delinquency, impropriety, mismanagement, offense.
'Negligence' or 'carelessness' is not included in the
synonyms for 'misconduct'. See 40 C. J. 1221 to the
same effect.
"Unless a word has a definite technical meaning,
in which case it is to be given that meaning, a word
in common use is ordinarily held to convey the meaning that attaches. to it in usual parlance. We are satisfied that the term 'misconduct', both in law and in
ordinary speech, usually ilnplies the willful doing of
an act with a wrong intention ....
''The case of Citizens' Insurance Co. v. Marsh, 41
Pa. 386, is the only one of many decisions examined
by us, where the issue was somewhat analogous to
the one in the instant case. That case has been cited
in later years as an authority for the general proposition that the term 'misconduct' implies Inalfeasance or unla-,vful conduct. There the plaintiff brought
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suit on a policy of insurance for the burning of a
steamboat. The defense set up that the burning was
due to 'misconduct' on the part of the captain and
not the result of ordinary negligence or carelessness.
The facts showed that the captain had engaged his
boat in a race with another steamboat; that, in order
to secure extra steam, he had a barrel of turpentine
brought out of the hold and the head knocked out;
that he ordered the barrel placed in front of the
boiler, so that the fuel could be saturated with turpentine immediately before being put into the boiler;
that fuel so saturated caught fire, which, spreading
first to the barrel of turpentine, and then to the boat
itself, finally resulted in the burning of the boat. An
act of congress in force at that time required that
turpentine be kept in metalic containers or compartments lined with metal and at a secure distance
from any fire.
"In reversing a decision for the plaintiff, the appellate court draws a sharp distinction between 'negligence' and 'misconduct'. At page 394 of the opinion above cited, the court says: 'These views may
help to draw the distinction between mere negligence, carelessness, or unskilfulness, and misconduct. It seems to us that, in usual parlance, when
these terms are contradistinguished, n1isconduct
means a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, where no discretion is left, except
what necessity may demand; and that carelessness,
negligence, and unskilfulness are transgressions of
some established but indefinite rule of action, vvhere
some descretion is necessarily left to the actor. Mis-

-··4Jf 14
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eon duct is a violation of definite law; carelessness,
an abuse of discretion under an indefinite law. Misconduct is a forbidden act; carelessness, a forbidden
quality of an act, and is necessarily indefinite'."
It is interesting to note that.-~ in "the Citizens Insurance
Co. v. Marsh case supra, the"~ s-tante ''required that turpentine be kept in metallic containers or con1partments
lined with metal and at a secure distance from any fire."
So far as appears fron1 the reference to that question by
the Rhode Island Court, the statute itself did not characterize the violation as 'n1isconduct' but the court found
that the captain's action was misconduct.
We are not left to any speculation in the case at bar.
Here the statute itself brands the violation as .'misconduct' and prescribed the punishment therefor. The violation of the statute and the regulations, therefore, cannot
be the subject of debate as to its meaning.
Along this same line "\Ve quote at length fro1n 38 An1.
Jr. pp 854, 855:
"178.-Wilful, Wanton, or Reckless Conduct.There is an abundance of authority for the proposition that contributory negligence is not a defense
in an action based upon wilful or wanton misconduct
or intentional violence. Even in jurisdictions where
the doctrine of comparative negligence is rejected as
a general principle of the common law, contributory
negligence is no defense to an action based on the
defendant's reckless, 'vilful, wanton, or intention~!
misconduct. There is no more reason for permitting
the defense of contributory negligence in a case
where the injury was cause by wilful, wanton, or
reckless 1nisconduct, than ·there is for permitting it
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in a case of assault and battery. No court has questioned the soundness of this proposition so far as injuries intentionally inflicted are concerned. So far as
wanton conduct is concerned, some discernment must
be exercised by the courts, or the defense of contributory negligence will be barred in any case merely
by the artifice of describing the conduct of the defendant as wanton. The distinction between negligence and wilful and wanton misconduct is well defined. Although conduct of the defendant precluding
the defense of contributory negligence has been
called negligence with such qualifying adjectives as
'gross,' 'wanton,' 'reckless,' or 'wilful,' strictly
speaking this is an incorrect and misleading use of
the word 'negligence.' Negligent conduct, whatever
may be the characterization applied to it, is not sufficient to preclude the defense of contributory negligence. A defendant's act is properly characterized
as willful, wanton, or reckless, within the meaning
of the foregoing rule, only when it was apparent, or
reasonably should have been apparent, to the defendant that the result was likely to prove disastrous
to the plaintiff, and he acted with such an indifference toward, or utter disregard of, such a consequence that it can be said he was willing to perpetrate it. The elements necessary to characterize an
injury as wantonly or wilfully. inflicted are (1)
knowledge of a situation requiring the exercise of
ordinary care and diligence to avert injury to another, (2) ability to avoid the resulting harm by ordinary care and diligence in the use of the means at
hand, and ( 3) the omission to use such care and diligence to avert the threatened danger, when to the
-·o~f
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ordinary mind it must be apparent that the result
is likely to prove disastrous to another. If one wilfully injures another, or if his ron duct in inflicting
the injury is so "'"anton or reckless that it amounts
to the same thing, he is guilty of n1ore than negligence. His conduct is characterized by wilfulness
rather than by inadvertance; it transcends negligence and is different in kind. Otherwise stated, the
omission to use care and diligence to avert a threatened danger to another constitutes conduct which
precludes the defense of contributory negligence
when it arises from a deliberate purpose to inflict
injury and also when it is due to that reckless disregard for the safety of others to which the law imputes an intention to do harin. For an act to fall
within the category of wanton or wilful negligence,
'Yhich renders the defense of contributory negligence
unavailable to a n1otorist who is charged with negligence, it need not spring from ill will or wear a
cloak of malicious intent.... ''
Referring to the foregoing ''elements necessary to
characterize an injury as wantonly or wilfully inflicted,''
attention is invited to the fact that in the case at bar
the respondent had more than a knowledge of the dangerous situation, he had a legal requirement to observe.
Third:
Appellant's motion for a new trial should have been
granted as against the respondent W. Ed Bingham for
the reason that the verdict of the jury was against the
great weight of the evidence which conclusively shows
that entirely aside from the laws and regulations governing student transportation heretofore set forth he was
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careless and negligent and guilty of misconduct in the
following respects and for the following reasons: He
was an experienced driver, having driven a bus for 18
years (Tr. p. 183), and he was charged with knowledge of
the Laws and Regulations relating to the driving of
school buses (Tr. p. 231). He knew of the dangerous intersection at Highway U-38 and 4800 South Street (Tr.
pp. 193, 194) and of the speed of automobiles passing
along U-38 and 4800 South Street (Tr. p. 193). He knew
of a previous accident involving a student at that intersection ( Tr. p. 189). Although on previous occasions he
had instructed his student passengers on what to do, he
did not do so on the date of this accident ( Tr. pp. 130,
131, 193, 194, 214, 235).
He had permitted, or by the
place he stopped t~e bus had required, children to pass in
front of the school bus on pr~vious occasions ( Tr. p. 145).
IIe had on various occasions changed the route of the
bus (Tr. pp. 185, 186) and had stopped at different places
both on Highway U-38 and on 4800 South Street (Tr. pp.
98, 127, 185, 186, 187, 225). The area for stopping was
wider on the northeast corner of U -38 ( Tr. p. 198). There
was no designated bus stop either on U-38 or 4800 South
Street as required by law, and he used his own judgment
as to where he stopped (Tr. p. 188). On the day of the
accident it had been raining and he parked the bus for
discharge of students on the southeast corner of the intersection of Highway U-38 and 4800 South Street in
line of traffic (Tr. pp. 21, 42, 43), and in such a position
that students proceeding west on 4800 South Street were
compelled to go in front of the bus rather than behind
it because of a ditch bank, mud and weeds (Tr. pp. 22,
23, 25, 43, 53, 139, 209, 216, 221). On the day in question
Lawrence P. Dawson, deceased, walked around the front
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of the bus (Tr. p. 190) and was struck by an automobile
being driven .by the defendant Guy Elias Carr (Tr. p.
192) receiving injuries as a result of 'which the boy died.
The ·evidence in this case discloses that Bingham in
spite of regulations to the contrary, and in his own words,
used his ~ •own judgn1ent'' as to where he would stop
the bus for the discharge of students. He had no legal
right to stop at the intersection in question at all, because
no stop had been designated there, but despite that fact
he assumed the responsibility for so doing, and did stop.
The effect of -\Y". Ed Bingham's conduct in stopping the
bus at various corners of the intersection resulted in confusion to the student passengers, who varied in ages from
6 to 14 years. At times he would stop on 4800 South Street
facing west; at other times on u~38 on the southeast
corner, and at other times he would proceed to the northeast corner of the same intersection. At still other times
he stopped a block or so south of the intersection to let
students off. On the day of this accident he stopped the
bus in such a position that children alighting from the
bus could not go around "the back of the bus to proceed
west because of wet weeds and mud caused by the rain.
Mr. Bingham had· been driving the bus for n1any years,
and entirely aside from the regulations· to the contrary
in stopping as he did, knew or should have kno\vn that
children in their youthful haste and in1pulse would go in
front of the bus to get ho1ne. He did not take ti1ne to warn
the1n of danger or to insist that they go behind the bus
hut on the contrary assun1ed an indifferent attitude towards the1n. In fact, he \vas so indifferent to their safety
that he stopped the bus in sueh a position that they
\vould ha.,.le heen foreed to 'valk in n1nd, through 'vet
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weeds to go around the back of the bus. In addition to
that-he could have proceeded across 4800 South Street
as he had previously done and parked on the northeast
corner in such a position that the children would have
been forced to go behind the bus. This he failed to do. Entirely aside from the questions relating to negligence as
a matter of law, and ''misconduct,'' and contributory
negligence, heretofore discussed in this brief, and referring for the moment to the questions relating to negligence in general, which evidently were the basis for the
view of the lower court, we submit that the finding of the
jury and the judgment of the court "no cause of action,"
as to the respondent W. Ed Bingham were contrary to
the great weight of the evidence. Knowing the traffic
danger at the intersection, knowing the actions and conduct and habits of children, knowing that he could stop
the bus where children could not pass in front of it, and
knowing that repeated warnings are necessary for the
safety of children, yet W. Ed Bingham in total indifference to the safety of these children took no steps whatever to protect or warn them on this day. There can be
no question but what his negligence was one of the proximate causes of the accident which resulted in death to the
boy Lawrence P. Dawson.
CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the verdict of the jury and
the judgment of the court, as to the respondent \V. Ed
Bingham, should be set aside and the case remanded for
a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
LEWIS J. WALLACE
M. BLAINE PETERSON
Attorneys for Appellant
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